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1 Introduction
Recent data about employment and poverty
provide insights that may surprise many working
in social protection. In 2013 an estimated
839 million workers globally were living in
poverty. Of these, 375 million experienced
‘extreme’ poverty (living on less than US$1.25
a day) and 464 million experienced ‘moderate’
poverty (living on between US$1.25 and US$2
a day) (ILO 2014a). In sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia the working poor comprise two-thirds
of the employed, with the extreme working poor
accounting for 42 and 26 per cent respectively.
Altogether, one-third of the developing world’s
workforce lives in poverty (ILO 2013). An
additional 661 million ‘near poor’ workers, or one
quarter of the developing world’s workforce, live
on US$2–4 a day. Overall, 58 per cent of the
developing world’s workforce remained poor or
near the poverty line in 2011 (ILO 2013, drawing
on Kapsos and Bourmpoula 2013).
At the same time, where there is economic
growth in low- and middle-income countries, the
associated increase in employment is limited and
of poor quality, often due partly to ongoing
dependence on minerals and agriculture.
Between 2007 and 2011, there was limited
structural change in labour markets as job
reallocation across sectors slowed. At the same
time, employment in low-productivity agriculture
fell and employment in industry and services
rose, but at a significantly slower rate than prior
to the 2008–09 food, fuel and financial crisis.
So, in the poorest regions, the challenge in the
labour market is to improve the quality of low-
productivity and poorly remunerated
employment rather than solely addressing the
lack of employment, per se. This is especially true
given the slow nature of structural
transformation and the continuing dominance of
employment in the agricultural and own-account
sectors (self-employment such as subsistence
agriculture or informal petty trade) which are
characterised by poor quality employment
(Filmer and Fox 2014).
In this context the aspiration has emerged that
social protection can play a role in promoting
productivity and creating much needed
sustainable employment, and it is this challenge
which social protection is charged with in many
social protection programmes in low-income
countries. In many places it remains an
aspiration, the evidence base is thin, and there is
little programming guidance for those seeking to
use social protection to support sustainable
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employment. Furthermore, in recent years social
protection and labour appear to have become
more distant, rather than closer, in the policies
and programmes of major social protection
donors. For example, whilst the 2005
Department for International Development
(DFID) definition of social protection included
labour standards, in practice DFID social
protection programmes rarely, if ever, focus on
the quality of labour, regulation or standards.
Similarly, in the World Bank, whilst historically
social protection and labour have been housed
together at a policy level, the links between them
have weakened over the years in programming.
Thus, whilst aspirations are high, it is not clear
that policymakers and programmers are
equipped with the knowledge and programme
design expertise to make connections between
social protection and sustainable employment.
This article seeks to address the knowledge part
of this gap. It aims to contribute to a better,
evidence-based understanding of the role that
social protection programmes can and do play in
supporting sustainable employment.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows.
We begin by defining social protection and key
concepts and terms related to sustainable
employment. We then identify the main ways, in
theory and in practice, by which social protection
programmes might support sustainable
employment in three cases. We do this with
reference to three types of social protection
programmes: basic cash transfer programmes,
public works programmes and livelihoods
programmes that incorporate a social transfer.
The conclusions suggest what the implications
might be for policymakers and programmes in
social protection.
2 Definitions
This article focuses on that part of social
protection that provides cash or in-kind transfers
to compensate for lack of, or insufficient, income.
Whilst social insurance (for example,
contributory pensions which insure against loss of
productive capacity in old age, or unemployment
benefits) is a critical part of the link between
social protection and employment, this article
focuses on social assistance – or transfers. This is
because social insurance is minimal in most low-
and middle-income countries and where it is in
place it tends to be concentrated among the less
poor in formal sector employment.1
The term employment is taken to include paid
wage labour opportunities in the formal and
informal economy, as well as self-employment in
‘own-account work’ including agricultural
smallholdings, microenterprises and other
activities, following the definition of ‘jobs’ as set
out in the World Development Report 2013 (World
Bank 2012). The quality of employment is
determined by the type of job, working
conditions, remuneration, the contract, benefits,
and safety and security at work.
Sustainable employment may be defined as
having three axes, comprising employment
which is ongoing and secure; offers adequate
remuneration and working conditions; and is
provided by the economy rather than external
interventions (such as aid), as illustrated in
Figure 1. In this definition we acknowledge that
the focus on market-based employment in the
third axis is not clear-cut. This is because state-
sponsored employment programmes can
potentially be sustainable and significant in
scale, with a prominent example being India’s
national public employment programme, the
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) which is
legislatively underpinned.
3 Theories of change for social protection and
sustainable employment
Theoretically, social protection programmes can
contribute to sustainable employment by
overcoming both supply- and demand-side
barriers to employment.
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Figure 1 Dimensions of sustainable employment
Source Authors’ own.
Duration: ongoing secure
job or livelihoods
Employment sustained
through market channels or
legislatively protected public
employment programmes
Quality: Adequate
conditions and
remuneration to enable
basic needs to be met
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The key supply-side barriers (formal and
informal, wage labour and own-production)
comprise a range of individual characteristics
relating to economic, social and cultural factors.
They can be summarised as: lack of skills, work
experience and/or life skills (job-seeking and
personal); lack of capital for job search; domestic
responsibilities and high dependency ratios;
gender, disability, ethnicity and social identity;
and lack of land, capital or assets. These
characteristics limit access to both wage and self-
employment by constraining the productivity and
diversity of livelihoods in which the working poor
engage. The dominant theory of change (TOC)
underlying much current social protection
programming is that transfers will enable
recipients to overcome some of these barriers.
This includes guaranteeing a transfer at times of
need, and thereby potentially easing constraints
to risk-taking behaviour which might promote
livelihoods diversification and entrepreneurship.
Social protection can enable beneficiaries to
overcome capital barriers to wage and own-
account employment, for example, by enabling
beneficiaries to fund education, training or travel
to seek work; and can help to improve the quality
of labour supply and overcome skills barriers to
employment, for example by promoting skills
and work experience within Public Employment
Programmes (PEPs).
Supply-side barriers to employment relate to
individual characteristics, but frequently the
barriers lie within the labour market, taking the
form of seasonal or chronic lack of demand,
which may be exacerbated by location. In such
contexts labour markets cannot absorb all job-
seekers, even if they are skilled and able to work.
In theory, social protection can play a role in
directly and indirectly affecting these demand-
side constraints through direct employment
creation and indirect or spillover effects.
Directly, social protection can play a role in
complementing market-based employment by
creating additional non-market employment
opportunities – usually sponsored by the state.
Typically, such PEPs offer cash or food in return
for labour inputs. Social protection provision can
also have spillover effects that extend beyond the
immediate household income benefit. Wages and
transfers can stimulate the local economy
(promoting local demand for goods and services)
and potentially have multiplier effects on local
economic development which extend beyond
primary recipients and result in increased labour
demand. The assets created through PEPs also
have the potential to contribute to spillover
effects that impact on local economic
development. These assets can impact on local
economic development inasmuch as the
infrastructure created can directly address
constraints to production. They can: increase
land under production; enhance productivity by
reducing environmental degradation, promote
soil and water conservation/irrigation; mitigate
disaster risk; and promote local markets by
improving economic integration (for example,
where the assets created are roads or bridges).
Some of these effects can be achieved through
simple cash transfer programmes, whilst others
require more complex programming – for
example, public works or livelihoods programmes
where a social transfer is one of a suite of
programme components. Social protection is often
accompanied by complementary programming in
the areas of training, microcredit, savings, and so
on. In the next section we examine the evidence
on three types of social protection programmes:
simple cash transfers; public works programmes;
and livelihoods programmes, and explore the
extent to which they address the barriers
identified above.
4 Cash transfer programmes and sustainable
employment
Despite the limitations of available impact
evaluations and research, it is possible to identify
challenges to the assumptions about the role of
social protection in relieving supply- and demand-
side constraints to sustainable employment.
Evidence indicates that cash transfer provision
can reduce supply-side barriers to sustainable
employment and potentially also increase local
demand through spillover effects. These effects
are to a large degree determined by transfer
design considerations, most notably the value of
the transfer. They are likely to vary depending on
whether labour-constrained households are
included or excluded from provision. In the latter
case the effects are primarily limited to indirect
spillover benefits.
Evidence consistently demonstrates that cash
transfers can create positive outcomes for own-
account activities and wage employment.
However, this depends on: (1) the sufficiency of
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the transfer; and (2) the economic context. Cash
transfer provision increases labour market
participation, particularly among women, by
reducing financial barriers to participation and
job search. In Brazil, recipients of the Bolsa
Escola and Bolsa Família programmes used
increased income to finance transport and
alternative childcare. In Namibia, provision was
followed by increased labour force activity by
women and increased job-search activity by men
and women. In South Africa, the labour force
participation rate of those receiving cash
transfers increased by 13 per cent to 17 per cent
compared to those in similar households not
receiving transfers, again with the greatest
increase for women (Standing 2012). Similarly,
receipt of the old-age pension in South Africa
had a significant positive impact on labour
supply and job search (Posel, Fairburn and Lund
2006).
Where sufficient to compensate for lost income,
transfers have also reduced labour market
participation among those not of conventional
working age, notably children and the elderly.
Lam, Leibbrandt and Ranchhod (2005), for
example, identify labour market withdrawal
among the elderly driven by pension receipt in
South Africa.
Cash transfers have also been found to impact
directly on livelihoods activity. Receipt of
transfer income has been found in some cases to
result in recipient households hiring additional
labour, thereby increasing the productivity of
land and assets previously underused, and
simultaneously promoting labour demand (DFID
2011). The Madhya Pradesh Unconditional Cash
Transfer and Tribal Village Unconditional Cash
Transfer pilots in India have also had significant
impacts on livelihoods and wage labour
(Standing 2013). In addition to productivity
gains, the pilots indicated that cash transfer
receipt enabled changes in the terms of labour
market engagement, namely:
a shift from casual wage labor to more own-
account (self-employed) farming and business
activity, with less distress-driven out-
migration. Women gained more than men…
There was an unanticipated reduction in
bonded labor (naukar, gwala). This has huge
positive implications for local development
and equity (Standing ibid.).
Access to transfers enabled recipients to shift
their location within a highly segmented labour
force, moving out of the most exploitative forms
of employment and into potentially more
sustainable forms. Here, transfer receipt
promoted movement out of casual wage labour
(where households were sometimes trapped in
bonded labour or caught in interlocked markets
for labour, land and credit) and into own-account
activities. It is not clear whether the effects will
be sustainable if the cash transfer is withdrawn.
Less well attested is how far cash transfers
support entrepreneurship by providing a safety
net, enabling recipients to develop skills and to
take entrepreneurial risks (Kaufmann 2010); nor
the circumstances in which precarious
entrepreneurial activity can become sustainable
employment. Evidence suggests that those
developing micro-survivalist businesses such as
petty trading may fall back into their economic
and livelihood status quo ante once the transfer
ends (Ndoto and Macun 2005). Overall, the
impact of such interventions on sustained
employment gains appears to depend on a
number of factors, including:
z value of the transfer relative to the depth of
poverty of receiving households, since a
greater share of the transfer is directly
consumed rather than used for
entrepreneurial purposes where it accounts
for a smaller proportion of the poverty gap
(Devereux 2002);
z duration of provision, which is neither
predictable nor sustained in many low-income
contexts;
z concentration of provision (the number of
beneficiaries in a location);
z nature of the local economy and its ability to
accommodate the additional goods and
services provided by new suppliers.
5 Public employment and sustainable
employment
Public Employment Programmes (PEPs), also
known as public works programmes, food/cash
for work and food for assets, provide non-market
employment sponsored by governments or
donors, and vary substantially. Some entail mass
direct job creation and provide ongoing or
cyclical employment, whilst others provide highly
rationed temporary employment. The former is
exemplified by the demand-driven Mahatma
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Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme (MGNREGS) in India, which provides
up to 100 days’ employment to over 50 million
workers each year on an ongoing basis and by the
Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in
Ethiopia, which provides seasonal employment
benefiting an average of 7 million people a year.
Rationed temporary approaches are exemplified
by the many PEPs providing one-off employment
opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa and South
and Southeastern Asian countries (McCord 2013).
With the PSNP, evidence exists of livelihoods
benefit and increased resilience, in terms of
returns to production, although only after
multiple years of employment combined with
complementary interventions. This outcome
conforms to all three axes of sustainable
employment, inasmuch as the intervention
provides:
z cyclical and reliable PEP employment;
z adequate PEP returns to labour;
z limited market-based livelihoods
improvements, relating to improved returns
to own-account activity (Berhane et al. 2011),
although not, for most farmers, resulting in
‘sustainable graduation’ (Devereux,
forthcoming).
Over the short term, and where the PSNP has
been implemented with only limited
complementary interventions, the impact on
livelihoods has not been significant (Berhane et
al. 2011) and the primary gains relate only to
direct PEP employment and income – the first
two axes of sustainable employment. However,
the programme does not result in the creation of
sustainable employment since ongoing PEP
employment relies on continued state and donor
sponsorship (which unlike India’s Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (MGNREGA) is not legislatively
guaranteed), rather than market-based demand.
Similar findings are emerging from the Vision
2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) in Rwanda,
where ongoing support is required to ensure
sustained productivity gains, and the programme
is not generating self-sustaining employment
outcomes independently.
Interestingly, the largest of all PEPs, the Indian
MGNREGS, is designed to provide ongoing
state-sponsored employment without seeking to
stimulate market-based sustainable employment
outcomes. As such it satisfies the first two axes of
sustainable employment, and arguably, the third,
because of the legislated nature of the
programme. MGNREGS provides an entitlement
to work where provision is based on an Act rather
than a project basis and, hence, provides work in
an ongoing and sustainable way. Furthermore,
the scale of the programme means that it has the
potential to affect the quality of existing market-
based employment and improve the terms of
employment (Basu 2011).
However, the MGNREGS and the PSNP are
exceptional in providing employment to
approximately 5 and 15 per cent of respective
national labour forces and offering ongoing or
repeated employment. Few other developing
country programmes provide similar coverage or
duration. PEPs providing short-term and one-off
support may address temporary labour market
disruptions effectively but do not stimulate
sustainable employment outcomes or respond to
the challenge of working poverty (Slater and
McCord 2009). Hence, PEP benefits are limited
beyond immediate benefits accruing from wage
receipt and offer few opportunities for the
accumulation of assets that can overcome supply-
side obstacles to employment. The low wages
paid under many schemes in many cases
replicate poor labour returns in the open labour
market, thereby contributing to, rather than
overcoming, extreme poverty among the working
poor.
There is little evidence to support the assertion
that short-term PEP employment provides work
experience and skills training that can promote
labour market engagement. Without increased
demand for low-skilled labour, and with few skills
transfers occurring, there is a risk that PEPs may
result in the substitution of one set of workers
for another, rather than aggregate increases in
employment (Harvey 2000). The limited
evidence suggests that PEPs do not have a
sustained impact on post-PEP employment (see
Ndoto and Macun 2005) and that PEP income is
primarily consumed due to low wage levels
(McCord 2003; Devereux 2002). Micro-
enterprise outcomes tend to be commensurately
small-scale and survivalist in nature and not
sustained after temporary employment and wage
transfer. The more effectively employment
targets the poorest, the lower the likelihood of a
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restricted wage resulting in sustainable
livelihoods or wage employment gains.
Inasmuch as PEPs provide additional work
opportunities, they can serve to ameliorate
underemployment, increasing the hours of paid
labour available (see, for example, Bandiera et al.
2013 relating to the Targeting the Ultra Poor
Programme in Bangladesh).
The assets created through PEPs can also
improve agricultural productivity, either of
beneficiary households or the wider community,
and stimulate increased labour demand,
although there is little evidence to show the
extent of such productivity gains or the
distribution of direct and indirect employment
opportunities resulting from them. This is an
area which is significantly under-explored,
particularly in terms of medium-term
(sustainable) rather than short-term outcomes.
Returns to labour
PEPs have the potential to impact on returns to
labour and hence affect the quality of wage
employment. Where a PEP wage is set below
market wages to ration access, sustained
employment gains are unlikely. However, when
set above market wage levels and in cases where
significant levels of employment relative to
labour supply are provided through the
programme, the PEP wage can create a
reservation wage that drives up market wage
rates, creating a wage floor. This has been
documented in relation to the MGNREGS by
Basu (2011). This outcome has been perceived by
some as negative in terms of labour market
distortion (del Ninno, Subbarao and Milazzo
2009), or more positively as a response to adverse
terms of employment (McCord 2013). Whichever
the perspective, it is important to note that the
returns to labour are improved; on one hand as
an indirect consequence of the impact of mass
PEP employment on market rates, and on the
other by enabling a limited number of workers to
withdraw their labour from adverse market-
based employment in favour of sponsored
employment.
However, such wage effects are only likely when
the scale of operation is significant relative to
local labour demand, and where there is
concentrated PEP employment such that some
form of collective bargaining is possible (Gaiha
1997). Wage effects also depend on other factors,
including the timing of PEP employment relative
to periods of high agricultural demand, whether
the PEP takes in primarily employed or
unemployed workers and the prevailing terms of
employment (for example, debt-bonded labour).
6 Livelihoods programming and graduation
In a number of ‘productive’ social protection
programmes, transfers are combined with
complementary interventions to promote own-
account productivity or wage employment in the
guise of a livelihoods programme. Typical
examples include the Chars Livelihoods
Programme (CLP) and Challenging the
Frontiers of Poverty Reduction (CFPR)
programme in Bangladesh, which have been
replicated elsewhere (see, for example, CGAP
2011). Complementary interventions include:
agricultural extension; microfinance and
financial inclusion; lump sum/asset provision;
and active labour market policies. The evidence
relating these to sustainable employment
outcomes is summarised here.
Agricultural extension
Results vary and depend on programme design
attributes, the socioeconomic characteristics of
recipient households and the broader
sociopolitical and economic context.
Complementary programming was central to the
design of the PSNP in Ethiopia. In the first
phase, the provision of agricultural extension
services was inadequate and households received
only limited support. This is indicative of a
challenge shared by many social protection
programmes aiming to promote productivity: the
limited reach of agricultural and development
programming in many low-income countries, and
the often low levels of funding and human
resources allocated to the agricultural sector,
following several decades of underinvestment
(Filmer and Fox 2014). The second phase of the
PSNP included a greater emphasis on supporting
the provision of complementary programming, in
the form of the Household Asset Building
Programme (van Uffelen 2013), as well as
agricultural extension. Later evidence indicates
that complementary services can play a role in
enhancing the food security impact of public
works employment (although not necessarily the
impact on sustainable employment), only when
PEP employment is provided over an extended
period (Berhane et al. 2011).
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Microfinance and financial inclusion
The promotion of microfinance and financial
inclusion as mechanisms to promote livelihoods
benefits and ‘graduation’ out of poverty are key
components of many social protection initiatives.
Transfer receipt enables regular saving and
financial inclusion promotes savings behaviour,
thus assisting participants to overcome financial
barriers to sustainable employment.
In the CFPR programme in Bangladesh, the
‘graduation model’ comprises cash transfers for
consumption alongside microfinance inputs,
skills training and provision of a lump sum or in-
kind asset transfer (CGAP 2011). Of more than
300,000 households receiving support, 75 per
cent were estimated to have become ‘food secure
and managing sustainable economic activities’
(ibid.). However, the extent to which
beneficiaries of such programmes have attained
sustainable employment outcomes is not
demonstrated in the evidence.
Lump sum provision for asset purchase
The provision of a cash transfer alongside a lump
sum for asset purchase recognises that lump
sums are unlikely to be used for investment
unless resources are provided to meet ongoing
consumption needs. CLP provided funds for the
purchase of an asset (such as livestock), technical
support (such as husbandry and veterinary
requirements) and a small monthly stipend to
prevent the sale of the asset before it became
productive (for example, providing milk and
calves) to meet immediate consumption needs
(Farrington and Slater 2009; see also Pritchard,
Kenward and Hannan, this IDS Bulletin).
Evidence suggests that such programmes have
the potential to contribute to sustainable
employment but are resource-intensive, raising
issues of feasibility in many countries.
Altogether, combinations of programme
components can have significant impacts on
labour opportunities. A recent study into the
Targeting the Ultra Poor (TUP) programme
component of the CFPR (Bandiera et al. 2013)
suggested that in line with employment
preferences, the extreme poor changed their
occupational status to engage in more productive
livelihoods when binding capital constraints were
removed (in the case of TUP) through an asset
transfer and associated training). What we know
less about is the extent to which these impacts
are sustained once the transfer element of
livelihoods programmes ends.
7 Programme design features and wider
spillover effects
Whilst limited, available evidence points to
broad conditions under which transfers are more
likely to result in sustainable employment
outcomes. Six key conditioning factors or
enablers/constrainers can be identified, relating
to programme, beneficiary, community and
market characteristics, namely: targeting,
transfer value, transfer duration, transfer
reliability, scale of coverage and integration with
other developmental programmes. Together,
these determine the extent to which successful
transition into sustainable employment
(graduation) can be anticipated (Mathers and
Slater 2014; Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux
2011; Huda et al. 2011).
7.1 Effective targeting
Different targeting approaches have different
impacts on sustainable employment. Trade-offs
exist between targeting that maximises poverty
reduction and targeting that maximises
sustainable employment outcomes. Targeting
particular demographic groups, such as elderly
or young people, is likely to directly address
supply-side barriers to employment when
recipient households have working-age members.
Indirectly, these approaches may stimulate local
aggregate demand, including hiring labour on
the part of labour-constrained households.
Targeting poor working-age recipients has
potential for directly supporting own-account
employment by building productive asset
portfolios at household level that increase
productivity. Targeting specific marginalised
groups may improve access to labour markets by
changing social status and exclusion, though
there is little evidence for this.
7.2 Transfer value
Small value transfers have little impact on
sustainable employment. They are mainly used
for consumption and are rarely sufficient to
enable significant asset accumulation or
investment in more productive activities
(Devereux 2002; Carter and Barrett 2006).
Impacts on local aggregate demand, and
therefore labour, are limited.
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7.3 Transfer duration
Duration of transfer receipt also has an impact
on the potential for accumulation and
investment, and on recipient behaviour. Ongoing
transfer receipt is necessary to achieve capital
accumulation (or sufficient human capital to
overcome education-related barriers to
employment). The longer the duration of the
transfer, the greater the potential for sustainable
employment gains (Berhane et al. 2011). Ongoing
inputs are also necessary for spillover effects to
be significant and sustained.
7.4 Transfer reliability
When transfers are predictable and regular they
enable recipients to plan their expenditure and
use it more productively. They also allow
households to access credit which is frequently
used to allow job search and migration to seek
more secure and better paid work. If unpaid for
many months, transfers are likely to be used like
lump sum ‘windfall’ transfers, since their primary
function of consumption smoothing is
undermined (Farrington and Slater 2009).
Irregular and delayed transfers can undermine
prospects for effective microfinance participation,
or local saving and borrowing activities. This can
even result in increased levels of indebtedness if
anticipated transfer flows, used as security for
loans, are delayed or not delivered.
7.5 Scale of coverage
The scale and concentration of social protection
coverage are critical determinants of impacts on
demand for goods, services and labour. A critical
mass of resources is required in a local economy
for a sustained period to stimulate rural
development and improved employment. Such
effects have been found in some programmes –
for example, with the Progresa programme in
Mexico (Barrientos and Sabates-Wheeler 2006) –
but where coverage and transfer value are low,
the impact is unlikely to be significant.
7.6 Integration with other developmental programmes
The final critical factor is whether social
protection complements other social, economic
and agricultural policies and interventions.
Social protection transfers can only address a
limited set of financial barriers to labour supply
and demand, with minimal impact on the
structural determinants of under- and
unemployment and related issues of social
exclusion. Complementary interventions are
required for a cash transfer to contribute to the
promotion of sustainable employment.
8 Spillover effects
Broader spillover effects of social protection on
sustainable employment occur primarily through
recipients’ increased demand for goods and
services (DFID 2011), including explicit
increases in labour demand arising from transfer
receipt, irrespective of recipient characteristics:
These multipliers apply equally to transfers
given to economically inactive groups (e.g.
social pensions or child support grants) as to
transfers given to small farmers, though the
synergies with agriculture are likely to be
higher if the recipients are farmers, who will
spend some of this incremental income on
farming (Sabates-Wheeler, Devereux and
Guenther 2009).
The magnitude and distributional impacts of
multipliers are contingent on factors including
the nature of the local economy and expenditure
patterns of groups receiving transfers. Sabates-
Wheeler et al. (2009) conclude that:
Although the macro-economic benefits
claimed for cash transfers are based on
limited empirical findings, and the evidence
to date is ambivalent (Devereux and Coll-
Black 2007), there is sound evidence from
Africa and Latin America for localised
multiplier effects of social transfers.
This evidence includes documented spillover
benefits of the Oportunidades cash transfer
programme in Mexico, beyond direct recipients,
resulting in consumption increases throughout
programme areas, among both those in receipt
and those not in receipt (Barrientos and Sabates-
Wheeler 2006). The evidence also identifies
regional multiplier effects resulting from cash
transfer programming in Malawi that stimulate
local commerce and trading activity (Davies and
Davey 2008), although the extent to which
benefits are sustained after transfer receipt is
not well documented.
Whilst the evidence base remains thin – in part
because there are no well-developed, robust
methodologies to monitor these effects and
explore the relationship between social
protection and sustainable employment – current
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initiatives such as the Food and Agriculture
Organization’s (FAO) ‘Protection to Production’
study2 may yield insights in the coming year (see
Daidone et al., this IDS Bulletin).
9 Conclusions
This article has explored the extent to which
social protection interventions may impact on
supply and demand barriers to sustainable
employment. Social protection transfers can
promote sustainable employment directly by
reducing supply-side barriers to employment;
indirectly by stimulating labour demand as a
result of increased demand for goods and services;
and by promoting aggregate employment through
sponsored work programmes.
A number of key design features that have the
potential to contribute to sustainable
employment across a range of social protection
instruments have been identified in this article.
If social protection programming can respond to
these six enabling factors, then the potential for
social protection provision to result in
sustainable employment will be enhanced. If not,
prospects for even direct welfare benefits are
limited, and secondary employment-related
effects are unlikely. It is important to note that
together these six factors reflect good practice
across social protection programmes in a very
broad sense and are shared across the three
social protection instruments discussed here.
There is no trade-off between the core objectives
of social protection (tackling poverty and
vulnerability) and the objective of sustainable
employment. Rather, what is good for social
protection in general, is also good for achieving
the best sustainable employment outcomes.
The major question arising from this review is the
extent to which the current scale and coverage of
programmes, and their predominant focus on
supporting self- or own-account employment, are
enough to tackle the dominant barriers to
sustainable employment. Current social protection
experience and practice remains focused on
tackling supply-side constraints (often by
attempting to turn the recipients of social transfers
into entrepreneurs) and far less attention is paid
to the demand side, which would entail a rather
more ambitious agenda of job creation, and the
quality of work created. Ultimately, from a
sustainable employment perspective, the
preoccupations of most social protection
expenditures – with their focus on creating
entrepreneurs (own-account workers) rather than
addressing challenges relating to the availability
and quality of employment – appear rather out of
kilter with the nature of much poverty in
developing countries, and especially the challenge
of underemployment, and the alarmingly high
and largely unrecognised scale of working poverty.
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Notes
* This article is based on research funded by the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT). The views and opinions expressed in
this document are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of DFAT or
the Australian government.
1 ‘Only a small minority of unemployed workers
in many developing countries can expect to
receive any kind of cash unemployment
protection benefits [contributory or non-
contributory]; 7.2 per cent of unemployed
workers in Asia and the Pacific, 4.6 per cent in
Latin America and the Caribbean, and less
than 3 per cent in the Middle East, North Africa
and Sub-Saharan Africa’ ILO (2014b: 36).
2 See www.fao.org/economic/ptop/publications/
reports/en.
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